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ABSTRACT
This essay aims to contribute robust grounds to question the
Susskinds’ inﬂuential, consequentialist logic when it comes to the
legitimacy of automation within the legal profession. It does so by
questioning their minimalist understanding of the professions. If it
is our commitment to moral equality that is at stake every time
lawyers (fail to) hail the speciﬁc vulnerability inherent in their
professional relationship, the case for wholesale automation is
turned on its head. One can no longer assume that, as a rule,
wholesale automation is both legitimate and desirable, provided it
improves the quality and accessibility of legal services (in an
accountable and maximally transparent way). The assumption,
instead, is ﬁrmly in favour of designing systems that better enable
legal professionals to live up to their speciﬁc responsibility. The
rest of the essay outlines key challenges in the design of such
profession-speciﬁc, ‘ethics aware’ decision-support systems.
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The fast expanding reach and prowess of computer systems has for a while now led some
to ponder when, if at all, computers might replace humans and in what capacities. Others
seek – more wisely – to grasp the reach and depth of the transformations that are already
well underway: new tools commonly end up changing not just the nature of the problems
they are meant to solve, but also the tool-users themselves. As such, the considerable
changes that have already been brought about by the development of ‘smart’ technologies
in the last ﬁfty years are not that remarkable, save for one thing: their sheer speed.
Today, the habits generated by technologies introduced a decade ago are so deeply
ingrained that many would not be able to contemplate a life without them. Mobile, con-
nected devices have not only changed the way we make friends, say. They are also chan-
ging our very understanding of what friendship stands for, what we can expect from our
friends, and what they can expect from us. Could the same be said of the way computer
systems are increasingly being deployed in professional contexts? Are these systems about
to change our very understanding of what the legal profession stands for, what we can
expect from it and what it can expect from us?
The Susskinds’ The Future of the Professions is an important book, not least because it
forces us to tackle the implications of recent progress in our ability to augment or
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automate central, ‘professional’ tasks. The Susskinds rightly denounce the professions’
head-in-the-sand response to the issues at stake: recent advances in our ability to
extract knowledge from professions-relevant data (thanks in part to novel natural
language processing techniques) have already started to revolutionise the way pro-
fessionals work. Rather than drag our feet or stare in disbelief we should, according to
the Susskinds, actively embrace the chance to make professional expertise more aﬀordable
and accessible. The latter, consequentialist mantra, is repeated throughout the book. Its
simplicity is made possible by an important assumption: there is no particular value
which the professions, in contrast to other expert service providers, ‘stand for’.
If the Future of the Professions’ inﬂuence is left to grow unchallenged, the Susskinds may
well be proven right. In the same way technological developments are changing our very
understanding of friendship, the systematic, eﬃciency-driven deployment of automated
systems within the professions may well turn the professions into ‘mere’ expert service
providers for good. In the meantime, to challenge the latter conclusion requires a level
of critical engagement that is currently lacking. This paper hopes to remedy this: while
it shares the conviction that computer systems will play an essential role within the
legal profession, and that this could transform it for the better, this paper unpacks key
hurdles on the way to the latter, normative conclusion. Before reviewing possible uses
(and abuses) of such systems within the legal profession (Section 2), Section 1 outlines
a critical understanding of the raison-d’-être underlying the professions as an institution.
1. A normative understanding of the professions: computer systems’
design and deployment constraints
One may, as a social scientist, acknowledge the professions as a historically rooted and
constantly evolving institution and limit oneself to recording those transformations and
possibly predicting future ones. A superﬁcial reading would lead one to argue that it is pre-
cisely what the Susskinds have endeavoured to do, based on a timely analysis of the likely
impact of the professions’ widespread reliance on increasingly capable machines. The
problem is: there is no such thing as a purely descriptive account of institutions. The
very delineating of that institution’s reach necessarily relies on some conceptual analysis.
Most importantly, the Susskinds’ explicitly normative judgment as to the positive impact
of technology-induced transformations presupposes some kind of functional analysis of
the ‘professions’ as an institution. And it is the Susskind’s minimalist and strictly instru-
mental analysis of the professions that underlies their normative conclusions.
Instead of the superﬁcial reading mentioned above, the Susskind’s normative conclusions
can be seen as the result of a – piecemeal – genealogical account of the professions. A gen-
ealogy necessarily marries historical investigation and functional analysis. In asking ‘why do
we have this or that institution?’, a genealogy presupposes that the object it studies can
meaningfully be treated as functional, that is, as serving an end other than itself.
Along this line, Susskind and Susskind refer, among other things, to Terence Johnson’s
historically informed critique of professionalism1 to debunk the still widely inﬂuential, tra-
ditional account of the professions as ‘devoted to the service of the public, above and
1T Johnson, ‘Imperialism and the Professions: Notes on the Development of Professional Occupations in Britain’s Colonies
and the New States’ (1972) 20 The Sociological Review 281.
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beyond material incentives’.2 Terence Johnson indeed denounces professionalism as a
mechanism for protecting occupational power through a mystiﬁcation process. Far from
serving the public interest, the professions, on that account, only serve to consolidate
certain occupations’ – lucrative – monopoly over the provision of particular services. The
knowledge asymmetry that triggers the need for such services is exploited (rather than com-
pensated) so as to make any critical assessment of their services beyond reach. Johnson’s
historically informed critique clearly contributes to the Susskinds’ ‘failure’ verdict: the pro-
fessions do not serve the public interest that their justiﬁcatory rhetoric claims to serve, given
their failure to deliver services that are aﬀordable, of good quality, and accountable. The
Susskinds’ normative conclusion is to embrace the radical transformation promised by
increasingly widespread reliance on automated systems within the professions.
Now, if instead of starting from the ‘devotion to public service’ functional hypothesis
(which informs the Susskinds’ normative conclusions), one were to start from a
diﬀerent answer to the ‘why do we have this institution’ question, one that highlights
the need for particularly stringent norms of ethical integrity within certain occupations,
one would get a diﬀerent story. While it is not possible, within this essay, to back this
up with the required historical investigations, it is likely that a genealogical critique
driven by such a functional interpretation would lead to diﬀerent conclusions. It might
be that the historical processes that brought about the professions as an institution are
only partly related to the ideal of ethical integrity as it features today in the professions’
justiﬁcatory rhetoric. Yet it is the case that, within certain occupations, there are
speciﬁc ethical challenges that are qualitatively diﬀerent from those entailed by the knowl-
edge asymmetry that characterises the provision of all expert services.
In a bid to expose the risks concomitant with the progressive conﬂation of professional
responsibility with that of expert service providers in general, I highlight in a separate
paper3 the speciﬁc vulnerability inherent in the lay-professional relationship. The diﬀer-
ence between the latter and the vulnerability concomitant with the hire of a mountain
guide (or car mechanic) is not one of degree: when our life is at stake on the mountain
side we are probably as vulnerable as can be. Independently of this primary vulnerability,
however, the lay-professional relationship can provide fertile ground for inferiorising
treatment that is wrong not because it violates some norm of fairness but rather
because it threatens our commitment to moral equality: our equal moral worth as individ-
uals independently of any contingent traits or status.
Be it through objectiﬁcation or infantilisation, the vulnerability inherent in the circum-
stances that prompt recourse to a professional can all too easily be exploited in a way
that compromises a lay person’s ability to meaningfully contribute to the way she projects
her sense of self, both socially and through her body. To retain a sense of ‘authorship’ over
one’s process of self-construction indeed requires that there be, to a minimal degree, some
movement of to and fro between the process of deﬁnition of our ‘self’ from without (human
encounters or environmental constraints) and from within (the way we appropriate these
encounters or constraints). This to and fro movement is never easy. In some circumstances,
it can be become particularly challenging: just like the person who has been diagnosed with a
2MS Larson and MS Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis, Vol 233 (University of California Press 1979).
3See S Delacroix, A Vulnerability-Based Account of Professional Responsibility (2018) <https://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=2840864>.
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grave illness, the person who is accused of murder will struggle to retain the sense that she
may contribute anything to the self she projects, other than the institutionally imposed ‘mur-
derer’ label. Outside criminal law, other circumstances such as sudden poverty or divorce
proceedings can also aﬀect one’s sense of authorship over that process of self-deﬁnition:
one may ‘no longer know how to continue, given who one was’.4
Interestingly, this vulnerability-based account ﬁnds an echo in what Susskind and Sus-
skind call the ‘disempowerment’ charge:
our professions, as presently organized, often discourage self-help, self-discovery, and self-
reliance; and they can unnecessarily inhibit or even alienate individuals who, once equipped
with better insight, would beneﬁt from engaging and participating more directly in their
problems.5
Susskind and Susskind frame the above concern as a psychological one. Yet -as Sangio-
vanni brilliantly suggests in his Humanity without Dignity6 – one may argue that when
disempowerment prevents a person from being able to play an active role in the deploy-
ment of her sense of self (as is the case in paradigmatic instances of social cruelty, such as
slavery, rape or torture), a fundamental value – moral equality – is under threat.7
If such a key value is indeed at stake in the way the professions operate (this is not a
premise I seek to demonstrate a priori8), one cannot help but be concerned by the
extent to which the special degree of responsibility it entails (and the non-utilitarian fra-
mework it demands) is bulldozed out of the range of relevant considerations. To those who
worry about ‘the loss of trustworthy institutions’, meant to ‘protect ourselves from exploi-
tation by unscrupulous quacks’, Susskind and Susskind retort:
[The professions’] members claim that they are not simply reliable but are also people of
upstanding character and motivated by non-selﬁsh interests. For many observers and provi-
ders, this strong sense of trust is an indispensable feature of professional work. It is important
that professionals are of outstanding moral character, and put the interests of the recipients of
their work ahead of their own. […] The trust objection suggests that the professions, and our
ability to trust in them in the strong sense, are the only way to resolve our fundamental chal-
lenge (that we all have problems for which we do not personally have the expertise to resolve).
Yet we think this is mistaken. Our primary need is only for a reliable outcome.9
The underlined sentence in the above passage encapsulates a fundamental problem in Sus-
skind and Susskind’s argument: it is expertise in general – not the professions – that is our
answer to what Susskind and Susskind call our ‘fundamental challenge’ (i.e. that none of us
has the knowledge necessary to be able to deal with every one of our needs or problems). This
should be obvious – so far nobody is suggesting that hairdressers, carpenters or indeed
4A Sangiovanni, Humanity Without Dignity: Moral Equality, Respect and Human Rights (Havard UP 2017).
5R Susskind and D Susskind, The Future of the Professions: How Technology Will Transform the Work of Human Experts (Oxford
University Press 2015).
6Sangiovanni (n 4).
7The conceptual link between our commitment to moral equality and the type of responsibility that stems from the speciﬁc
vulnerability inherent in the lay-professional relationship is articulated at length in Delacroix (n 3).
8Depending on the way professionals operate (exacerbating or moderating the particular vulnerability concomitant with
the need for legal or other services), this key value- moral equality- is threatened (or not). Why? Because exploiting some-
one’s vulnerability to compromise her ability to deploy her sense of self is a form of social cruelty (as per Sangiovanni),
that is diﬀerent only in degree from the most paradigmatic instances, such as rape, slavery or torture. So my argument
does not start from the premise that the professions have a commitment to moral equality, but posits instead that the
professions’ way of operating cannot help but have an impact on the extent to which this fundamental value is upheld.
9Susskind and Susskind (n 5), my emphasis.
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mountain guides should be counted as members of the professions. So why do the Susskinds
repeatedly seek to level down the diﬀerence between the professions and experts by empha-
sising that they both answer the same ‘knowledge problem’? Strictly speaking, they do both
answer that problem, but to repeatedly articulate our concept of the professions solely by
reference to that common denominator is a sure way of ridding it of any substance.
It may be unfair to argue that this precisely the Susskind’s agenda.10 Yet one gets the
sense that, for the Susskinds, the claim to ethical integrity that most deem to be an essential
part of our concept of the professions is but a contingent, historically rooted claim. While
it still plays a role in the professions’ justiﬁcatory rhetoric,11 that claim can be shown to
have increasingly little in the way of empirical evidence to back it up.12
There is indeed no lack of empirical evidence to support the Susskinds’ key verdict – re-
iterated throughout The Future of the Professions: our professions are failing. They are ‘by
and large, […] unaﬀordable, under-exploiting technology, disempowering, ethically chal-
lengeable, underperforming, and inscrutable’.13 This is a hefty and seemingly comprehensive
charge-list. Yet when one looks at the narrative behind each of these charges, one ﬁnds that
they mostly (except for the – notable – disempowering aspect) fall under a broadly utilitarian
outlook on the professions. That outlook can be summarised under point 1 below:
1: the professions do not serve the public interest they claim to serve, given their failure to
deliver services14 that are aﬀordable,15 of good quality,16 and accountable.17
10The Susskinds devote substantial parts of their book to discussing various accounts of the professions.
11‘When we consider why the professions established their reputations for trustworthiness in the ﬁrst place, they likely did
so to meet this primary concern. Put another way, they established a reputation for trustworthiness not as an end in itself,
but as a useful way to signal their reliability to others’.
12B Keogh, Review into the Quality of Care and Treatment Provided by 14 Hospital Trusts in England: Overview Report (NHS
2013); T Lagu and others, ‘A Mixed-Methods Analysis of Patient Reviews of Hospital Care in England: Implications for
Public Reporting of Health Care Quality Data in the United States’ (2013) 39 Joint Commission Journal on Quality and
Patient Safety 7; KMJMH Lombarts and others, ‘Measuring Professionalism in Medicine and Nursing: Results of a European
Survey’ [Public Library of Science] (2014) 9 PLoS ONE e97069; R Moorhead, ‘Lawyer Specialization–Managing the Pro-
fessional Paradox’ (2010) 32 Law & Policy 226; R Moorhead, ‘Precarious Professionalism: Some Empirical and Behavioural
Perspectives on Lawyers’ (2014) 67 CLP 447; R Moorhead, A Sherr and A Paterson, ‘Contesting Professionalism: Legal Aid
and Nonlawyers in England and Wales’ (2003) 37 Law & Society Review 765; R Moorhead and others, Quality and Cost: Final
Report on the Contracting of Civil, Non-Family Advice and Assistance Pilot (The Stationary Oﬃce 2001); MJ O’Fallon and KD
Butterﬁeld, ‘A Review of the Empirical Ethical Decision-Making Literature: 1996–2003’ (2005) 59 Journal of Business Ethics
375; A Paterson and A Sherr, ‘Quality, Clients and Legal Aid’ (1992) 142 New Law Journal 783; A Sherr, R Moorhead and A
Paterson, Lawyers-the Quality Agenda Vol. 1 Assessing and Developing Competence and Quality in Legal Aid; the Report of
the Birmingham Franchising Pilot (HMSO 1994).
13Susskind and Susskind (n 5). In the legal domain, see e.g. SJ Harper, The Lawyer Bubble : A Profession in Crisis (Basic Books
2013).
14Because of its intrinsic link to the aﬀordability and quality of the services delivered, the failure to exploit up-to-date tech-
nologies charge can be incorporated into the aﬀordability and quality charges.
15‘Most people and organizations cannot aﬀord the services of ﬁrst-rate professionals; and most economies are struggling
to sustain most of their professional services, including schools, court systems, and health services’ Susskind and Susskind
(n 5).
16‘The ﬁfth problem with the professions is that they underperform. This is not to suggest that the professions invariably
achieve low levels of attainment. Rather, we maintain that in most situations in which the professions’ help is called for,
what is made available may be adequate, good, or even great, but rarely is it world-class’; ibid. In the legal domain, there
is a growing body of empirical literature, reviewed in detail – mostly in the British context – in Moorhead, ‘Precarious
Professionalism: Some Empirical and Behavioural Perspectives on Lawyers’ (n 12), that paints an even bleaker picture
than that suggested by Susskind and Susskind (n 5).
17‘Recipients of professional services, often by the nature of the arrangement, are able, neither to evaluate the substance of
the guidance they receive nor to judge whether a given profession is best placed to undertake the work. Sometimes, of
course, the problem being solved or the work being undertaken is so complex that no lay person could hope to grasp
what is going on. But there are occasions, no doubt, when there is intentional obfuscation, to justify high fees, perhaps, or
for straightforward self-aggrandizement. Where there is opacity and mystiﬁcation, there will be mistrust and a lack of
accountability’; Susskind and Susskind (n 5).
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There is little doubt that the growing availability and sophistication of automated systems
could have a positive impact on the professions’ ability to better honor the so-called ‘grand
bargain’ that ‘grants professionals both their special status and their monopolies over
numerous areas of human activity’.18 There is clear potential for those systems to dramati-
cally improve both the affordability and quality of the services delivered by the professions.
Yet Susskind and Susskind’s unquestioning adherence to a utilitarian framework means
their analysis misses the extent to which the increased availability of automated systems
has the potential to reinforce, rather than alleviate, another way in which the professions
may be said to be showing signs of failing:
2: The professions do not live up to the ideal of ethical integrity that plays a key role in their
self-conception and justiﬁcation of relative self-regulation
In large part because their outcome-focused analysis leads them to deem the pro-
fessions’ ideal of ethical integrity to be a contingent (rather than conceptual) feature, Sus-
skind and Susskind brush oﬀ rather lightly the possibility that computer systems might
worsen (rather than alleviate) the second way (encapsulated in ‘2’) in which the pro-
fessions are failing.19 While they do refer to ethics in the charge-list mentioned above,
their way of formulating that concern does not depart from their overall utilitarian
outlook and merely prolongs the aﬀordability aspect via a concern for distributive
justice: ‘if we have the technological means to spread expertise in society far more
widely at much lower cost, we believe we should strive to make this happen’.20 Indeed,
who wouldn’t?
Yet within the professions it is not just ‘expertise’ that automated systems will spread. It
is also the ethical challenges that stem from the vulnerability inherent in the lay-pro-
fessional relationship. Today those challenges are as pressing as ever: one might argue
that, as Western societies’ concern for moral equality has grown, so has the saliency of
the professions’ particular ethical responsibility. Sadly though, there is little evidence
that this increased saliency has in fact led to growing ethical awareness within the pro-
fessions. Hence the normative conclusions that stem from this ‘alternative’ genealogical
critique would, overall, be remarkably similar to the Susskinds’, with an important
proviso: the success criterion for emerging uses of computer systems in the professions
should not ‘just’ be whether they improve the aﬀordability, quality and accountability
of the professions’ services. On those three counts, a lot of automated systems are likely
to be successful.
Interestingly, the Susskinds acknowledge this outcome-independent line of argument
by referring to Sandel’s ‘moral limits’ objection:21 could it be that we feel uncomfortable
about the idea of an increasing number of professional ‘tasks’ being handled by computer
18ibid.
19Unlike aﬀordability or quality concerns, which lend themselves to an outcome driven approach, the professions’ (relative)
failure to live up to their ideal of ethical integrity is notably diﬃcult to pin down. Recent empirical studies (mostly in the
ﬁelds of law and medicine, less so in education) paint a rather worrisome picture when it comes to assessing the extent to
which ‘the professions’ live up to various interpretations of the ideal of ethical integrity that plays such a role in both their
self-understanding and the ‘grand bargain’ at the root of their relative monopoly and self-regulation privileges. BG Garth,
‘Rethinking the Legal Profession’s Approach to Collective Self-Improvement: Competence and the Consumer Perspective’
(1983) Wisconsin Law Review 639; HP Gunz and SP Gunz, ‘The Lawyer’s Response to Organizational Professional Conﬂict:
An Empirical Study of the Ethical Decision Making of In-house Counsel’ (2002) 39 American Business Law Journal 241.
20Susskind and Susskind (n 5).
21MJ Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (Macmillan 2012); Susskind and Susskind (n 5).
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systems for reasons that are similar in kind to those that underlie our repugnance at body
organs being traded like ordinary goods? Sandel seeks to capture what underlies our
concern about the proliferation of market norms (which, in the context of the present dis-
cussion, would displace ‘professional norms’) by referring, among other things, to two key
objections. Sandel’s ‘inequality objection’ – ‘[i]n short, if inequality is large enough,
markets may lead to a lack of adequate or “meaningful consent” in the choices people
make’22 – is quickly dealt with, the Susskinds pointing out that automated systems will
improve access to aﬀordable expertise and will only aﬀect the provision of expertise
(not payment for it).
Most interesting is the Susskind’s answer to Sandel’s ‘corruption objection’, which they
formulate as a ‘trade-oﬀ’ –here their answer is worth quoting in full:
Let us turn now to the Corruption Objection. There are two basic reasons why we might also
resist this—either because we do not think that the professions in fact have a special moral
character, or because we do not think that this character is degraded in the market. But
suppose instead that both are true—that the professions do have this character and that it
is degraded in some way if their work is done according to market norms. In that case,
there is a trade-oﬀ—we must strike a balance between the value we place on protecting
this moral character and the value we place on the pursuit of greater access to aﬀordable prac-
tice expertise. The Corruption Objection is clear on how to resolve this trade-oﬀ—the pursuit
of the latter comes at the price of the former, but that price is too high and ought to be
resisted. In contrast, we believe, for two reasons, that a diminution in the moral character
of professional work is a price worth paying. First, the professions, unlike many other occu-
pations, are responsible for many of the most important functions and services in society. It
was recognition of the importance of their work that drove the initial ‘grand bargain’ (see
section 1.4). Secondly, levels of access and aﬀordability to the practical expertise that the pro-
fessions provide fall well short of acceptable.23
One may want to pause and disentangle the two diﬀerent ways in which the notion of
‘price’ intervenes in the passage above. First it surfaces implicitly in the Susskinds’ refer-
ence to Sandel’s argument – i.e. there are things whose nature is perverted (and hence their
value to us is undermined) by any endeavour to place a price on them. The Susskinds ‘ﬁnd
Sandel’s arguments to be compelling in general’.24 Yet they resist the application of such
arguments to the displacement of professional norms by market norms because ‘a dimin-
ution in the moral character of professional work is a price worth paying’ (see above). Here
the word ‘price’ conveys the fact that, because the two values at stake cannot be reconciled,
one of them must give way. The problem is that while the nature of one of the values at
stake is pretty clear – increasing accessibility to the professions (which itself must stem
from a concern for equality of opportunity) – the other is not. The Susskinds only refer
to ‘a diminution in the moral character of professional work’, without much indication
of what might ground that moral character.25 Given their wide-ranging, minimalist under-
standing of the professions as ‘our answer to the limited knowledge problem’, it is far from
clear what, in their account, warrants granting that moral character to the professions.
22Susskind and Susskind (n 5).
23ibid.
24ibid.
25In fact, the Susskinds frequently remind us that ‘it is important not to exaggerate this dimension of professional activity’:
‘Moreover, “moral” tasks may well feature more prominently in professional work than they do in other sectors. Again,
though, it is important not to exaggerate this dimension of professional activity. It would be disingenuous to suggest that
all professional work involves matters of the gravest ethical signiﬁcance’; ibid.
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That moral character is ﬂeshed out, by contrast, in the vulnerability-based account of
the professions hinted at above,26 and explicitly tied to a key value: moral equality. Given
the very particular type of vulnerability at stake, the very shape (and depth) of our com-
mitment to moral equality is determined in part by the way our professions meet, on a
daily basis, the demands entailed by this vulnerability (it might be that, as a matter of
fact, our commitment to moral equality is all too often left in rather bad shape by our pro-
fessions –see note 8). Now let’s imagine – for the sake of the argument – that the Susskinds
are happy to endorse the above. If it’s our commitment to moral equality that explains the
professions’moral character, then such is also the value that, in their ‘trade-oﬀ’, gives way
in favour of the Susskind’s concern for a diﬀerent kind of equality: equality of access to
professional expertise. If so, one may start to worry about the extent to which such a
trade-oﬀ makes sense. In his ‘The idea of equality’,27 Williams eloquently depicts the
way in which ‘equality of respect’ (i.e. moral equality) and equality of opportunity will
often end up ‘pulling in diﬀerent directions’, urging us to nevertheless resist the ‘tempta-
tion to abandon some of its elements’. For it is tempting
to claim, for instance, that equality of opportunity is the only ideal that is at all practicable,
and equality of respect a vague and perhaps nostalgic illusion; or alternatively, that equality of
respect is genuine equality, and equality of opportunity an inegalitarian betrayal of the ideal –
all the more so if it is thoroughly pursued, as now it is not.28
The good news is that there is no need, in this particular instance, to ‘abandon’ any-
thing, and the Susskinds’ trade-oﬀ between the professions’ moral character and their
accessibility is only live because of a false premise: that the professions’ ‘moral character’
will be degraded by the introduction of ever more capable computer systems. That premise
is false on one condition: that these systems be designed and introduced in a way that frees
the professions to take the full measure of the responsibility that is theirs in virtue of the
very particular type of vulnerability they are confronted with. This is discussed in Section
2.2, while Section 2.1 critically examines the normative assumptions commonly held by
wholesale automation enthusiasts.
2. Possible (ab)uses of computer systems within the professions
2.1. When data trumps rules (and principles?): automation’s potential scope
As a methodology that is well suited to automating those tasks that rely heavily on ‘tacit
knowledge’ Machine Learning (ML) is destined to have a large impact on professional,
value-loaded contexts. Only 15 years ago, the possibility of replacing professionals in
such tasks as medical diagnosis was deemed implausible, given its ‘non-routine’ character.
The latter characterisation – routine v. non-routine tasks29 – was used30 to distinguish
those tasks ‘that can be accomplished by following explicit rules’ (and hence lend
26This account is fully articulated in Delacroix (n 3).
27B Williams, ‘The Idea of Equality’ in B Williams (ed), Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956–1972 (CUP 1973).
28ibid.
29According to Polanyi, non-routine tasks rely on tacit knowledge about which ‘we can know more than we can tell’; M
Polanyi, ‘The Logic of Tacit Inference’ (1966) 41 Philosophy 4.
30D Autor, FS Levy and RJ Murnane, ‘Upstairs, Downstairs: Computers and Skills on Two Floors of a Large Bank’ (2002) 55(3)
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 432.
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themselves to automation) versus those ‘for which the rules are not suﬃciently well under-
stood to be speciﬁed in computer code and executed’.31 Today, this rules-based demar-
cation (traditional, rule-based expert systems need explicit rules) is both obsolete and
misleading. Because ML algorithms operate on the basis of a fundamentally diﬀerent
methodology from that underlying expert systems, the extent to which a task can be dis-
tilled into rules (whether explicit or tacit32) has become irrelevant. What matters, instead,
is the accessibility and quality of the recorded data pertaining to that task: the more abun-
dant the data, the more robust the correlations, which in turn determine the performance
of the ML algorithm.
As an example, a recent medical application allowing for wholly automated skin cancer
diagnosis33 will have been trained on a large dataset structured as example pairs (x, y)
where ‘x’ corresponds to the images containing skin lesions – the pixels – and ‘y’ identiﬁes
whether it is cancerous or not – the disease label. The aim of the system’s learning process
is to ﬁnd a function f:X →Y that matches the example pairs. Such a function need not –
and in fact does not – reﬂect the rules – tacit or otherwise – which dermatologists follow
when assessing skin lesions.34
Of course, the pertinent datasets are not always neatly labelled example pairs that are
relatively free of any syntactic ambiguity, as in the example above. The set of data X can be
generated by the artiﬁcial agent’s interaction with the environment. In that case the aim of
the learning process is to come up with an action-selection policy that minimises some
measure of long-term cost. Systems combining supervised learning from human expert
games (where x is the game strategy, and y the game result) with reinforcement learning
from games of self-play have recently made headlines given their ability to outperform
human experts.35 Outside the world of games, a system designed to predict the
outcome of cases tried by the European Court of Human Rights has also received a lot
of attention, given its impressive accuracy (79 percent).36 That system was based on a
binary classiﬁcation task – is a speciﬁc article of the Convention violated or not? –
similar to that of the skin cancer application, except that instead of having images as
31F Levy and RJ Murnane, ‘The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration’ (2003) 118 The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 1279.
32In contrast, D Autor, Polanyi’s Paradox and the Shape of Employment Growth, Vol 20485 (National Bureau of Economic
Research 2014) insists on holding on to this concept of ‘non-routine task’, by – misleadingly– explaining recent successes
in applications relying on tacit knowledge thus: ‘[R]ather than teach machines rules that we do not understand, engineers
develop machines that attempt to infer tacit rules from context, abundant data, and applied statistics.’ DH Autor, ‘Why
Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace Automation’ (2015) 29 The Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 23.
33A Esteva and others, ‘Dermatologist-Level Classiﬁcation of Skin Cancer with Deep Neural Networks’ (2017) 542 Nature 115
describes a system that can accurately predict whether a picture of a skin lesion is cancerous or not. The performance of
that system was found to be ‘on a par’ with that of a group of 21 board-certiﬁed dermatologists.
34It is important to understand that this independence from the professional’s thought processes applies to all of machine
learning’s recent forays into the professions. This methodological point has signiﬁcant implications. It has for instance
long been assumed that, if successful, the automation of key aspects of doctors’ work would spell the end of the
Courts’ deference towards the expertise underlying clinical judgment, as it would prove that the relevant knowledge
can in fact be applied ‘mechanically’ and is hence routinized’. Since the success of Machine Learning, this assumption
has been proven wrong. At best, all a judge would ﬁnd, were she to open the ‘black box’ at the heart of Machine Learning
applications, would be a large collection of seemingly random correlations (since learning algorithms proceed indepen-
dently of any modelisation of the processes underlying the task at stake).
35D Silver and others, ‘Mastering the Game of Go with Deep Neural Networks and Tree Search’ [Nature Publishing Group]
(2016) 529 Nature 484.
36N Aletras and others, ‘Predicting Judicial Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: A Natural Language Proces-
sing Perspective’ (2016) 2 PeerJ Computer Science e93.
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input, this system relied on recent progress in natural language processing to classify
textual input (extracted from published ECHR cases).
These advances have enabled the birth of a so-called ‘science of judicial predictions’.
Unlike ‘amateur’ prediction models, ‘which are typically assessed ex post to infer
causes’, the algorithmic model developed by Katz et al.37 to predict the decisions of the
US Supreme Court over nearly two centuries (despite changes in the Court composition
and socio-cultural contexts) for instance managed to anticipate whether the court would
‘reverse’ the status quo or not with 70.2% accuracy. A similar endeavour, which focussed
on the French Court de Cassation rulings (with more diverse outcome variables38)
managed to predict the court ruling based on the case description with impressive
accuracy.39
While these court cases predictions do bring beneﬁts (particularly for those businesses
whose risk models in part depend on the outcome of such cases), they also come with
dangers. The most evident risk is that of inherent conservatism: cases with a low
success prediction are unlikely to be heard in court, in turn making organic changes
within case law less likely. The latter changes indeed often depend upon an accumulation
of previous, unsuccessful cases that trigger a growing number of dissenting voices (both
within and without the judiciary). While there may be ways of developing tools that
not only predict the chances of success in court, but also the likelihood that a particular
case will eventually contribute to some organic evolution within case law, there will be
little commercial incentives for the latter tools. The other type of risk concomitant with
such prediction tools is less tangible, but could nevertheless contribute to a shift in the
aspirations we associate with law: those who deem prediction accuracy to be the most
promising aspect of recent technological advances within the legal profession indeed
often assume that the success of a legal system can and ought to be measured according
to the extent to which such a system reduces uncertainty. From that perspective, if those
advances ultimately allow us to automate (rather than merely predict) court rulings, we
should embrace them: how better to foster ‘the rule of law [which is] preferable to that
of any individual’40 than by substituting algorithmic predictability for ﬁckle human judg-
ments? As Pasquale puts it: ‘One literal way of achieving the oft-quoted ideal “a rule of law,
not of men” is to dispense altogether with persons implementing or interpreting law’.41
37DM Katz, MJ Bommarito II and J Blackman, ‘A General Approach for Predicting the Behavior of the Supreme Court of the
United States’ (2017) 12(4) PLOS ONE e0174698 <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0174698>. Remarkably, the same
authors went on to test the accuracy of crowdsourcing ‘as an alternative to expert-based judgment or purely data-driven
approaches’ to predicting future Supreme Court decisions, and reached an impressive 80.8% accuracy M Katz, MJ Bom-
marito and J Blackman, ‘Crowdsourcing Accurately and Robustly Predicts Supreme Court Decisions’ (2017) <https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3085710>.
38Cassation, Cassation sans renvoi, Cassation partielle, Cassation partielle sans renvoi, cassation partielle cassation, cassation
partielle rejet cassation, rejet, irrecevabilité (non-lieu à statuer, non-lieu à recevoir, qpc seule irrecevabilité, were excluded
because of their rarity).
39The accuracy score varies depending on the number of outcome variables that are selected (8 or 6): ‘We observe an
apparent 6 percentage points decrease in average scores when the classiﬁer is trained on the dataset with more
classes’. OM Sulea and others, ‘Predicting the Law Area and Decisions of French Supreme Court Cases’ (2017)
<arXiv:1708.01681>.
40Aristotle, The Politics (Cambridge University Press 1996) Book III, Ch 16, p 88.
41FA Pasquale, ‘A Rule of Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation’ (2018) George Washington Law Review
forthcoming refers to ‘automators of law [who] tend to see their work as one more step toward elevating the legal system
above the fallibility of any particular person within it’ and cites JC Smith, ‘Machine Intelligence and Legal Reasoning – The
Charles Green Lecture in Law and Technology’ (1998) 73 Chicago-Kent Law Review 277 in that context.
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In an endeavour to highlight the perils inherent in the literal (and reductive) under-
standing of the rule of law presupposed by wholesale automation enthusiasts, Pasquale
articulates ‘what is lost when society cedes more aspects of the authoritative articulation
of rights and duties to computational processes’.42 He does so through a detailed survey
of both modest (from automated tax preparation to contesting parking tickets) and less
modest ‘substitution through legal automation’ endeavours. While the former, low-
stakes substitutive legal automation is, on balance,43 deemed a ‘laudable phenomenon’,44
Pasquale emphasises the far-reaching long-term costs inherent in proposals to accelerate
what he calls ‘the robotization of law’. In this respect, he joins a growing number of voices
– Mireille Hildebrandt45 notable among them – who warn us of the way in which:
we can no longer take the Rule of Law for granted as an aﬀordance of our information
and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure, due to the rapid and radical inte-
gration of algorithmic decision-systems and other types of data-driven intelligence into
the administration of justice […] If the technological embodiment of modern law and
its oﬀspring, the Rule of Law, is changed, the law itself will change – potentially
beyond recognition.46
This essay is an invitation to step back: just as Section 1 considered an alternative
interpretation of the raison d’être underlying the professions (one that is not easily com-
patible with the Susskinds’ consequentialist mantra when it comes to assessing the legiti-
macy of wholesale automation), the next Section 2.2 stems from a shift in focus. If, instead
of maximising legal certainty, one aims to empower legal professionals to live up to their
ethical responsibility, the diﬃcult questions when it comes to designing computer systems
for the legal profession are less about the degree of autonomy they should be endowed with
and more about how to achieve true human-computer complementarity.
2.2. Achieving human-computer complementarity through decision-support
systems
There will be cases (think parking ﬁnes) where there is little downside to the vital increase
in aﬀordability and accessibility that automation brings, provided transparency, account-
ability and privacy are preserved – as far as possible.47 Yet aside from administrative legal
work (case management is one example), such clear-cut cases of unproblematic, wholesale
automation are not that common: laudable as it may be, the drive to democratise legal
42Pasquale (n 41).
43Pasquale highlights the often-underestimated extent to which automation (whether in the tax domain or otherwise)
often ends up licensing higher levels of legal complexity – and reduced transparency.
44Pasquale (n 41).
45M Hildebrandt, Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law: Novel Entanglements of Law and Technology (Elgar 2015).
46M Hildebrandt, ‘The Force of Law and the Force of Technology’ in M McGuire and T Holt (eds), The Routledge Handbook for
Technology, Crime and Justice (Routledge 2017).
47The extent to which full transparency is in fact both achievable and desirable varies according to particular applications. A
Weller, ‘Challenges for Transparency’ (2017 ICML Workshop on Human Interpretability in Machine Learning (WHI 2017))
outlines several reasons to doubt the desirability of transparency, particularly when the latter allows users to ‘game’ the
system. Accountability concerns (and the need for ‘explainable AI’) have given rise to a fast-growing research ﬁeld that is
beyond the scope of this review. See among others B Mittelstadt and others, ‘The Ethics of Algorithms: Mapping the
Debate’ (2016) 3 Big Data and Society 1; M Veale, M Van Kleek and R Binns, ‘Fairness and Accountability Design
Needs for Algorithmic Support in High-Stakes Public Sector Decision-Making’ (2018) <arXiv preprint
arXiv:180201029>; S Wachter, B Mittelstadt and L Floridi, ‘Transparent, Explainable and Accountable AI for Robotics’
(2017) 2 Science Robotics 1.
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expertise by distilling it into mass-market, problem solver apps can conceal issues that
demand human input. As an example, an app that allows those who have recently been
dismissed from their job to avail themselves of their right to severance pay (which may
be opaque due to complex legislation) is commendable. Yet without a proactive referral
system (to employment lawyers, but also potentially other types of social or psychological
support) such an app would, in many ways, be deemed to fail its users: the vulnerability
that is concomitant with ﬁnding oneself jobless indeed cannot be addressed by algorithms,
no matter how much empathy such apps may be able to display.
At the ‘lay’ end, apps of the kind mentioned above may be deemed invaluable, empow-
ering tools48 for those who would otherwise be left unaware of and unable to exercise their
rights. Yet wherever our commitment to moral equality is at stake (given the special kind
of vulnerability described above), such apps ought to be conceived as gateways or ‘triage
devices’ directing to appropriate human advice, rather than replacing it altogether.
At the legal professional’s end, automated systems could, in principle, be designed so as
to allow legal professionals to develop greater emotional and situational awareness and see
beyond ‘the usual man in the usual place’49 when meeting, interviewing or defending a
client. Ethical lapses within professional practice indeed most often stem from a failure
to discern ethically relevant considerations which may only be distantly connected to
the problem in relation to which a professional is consulted. Whether it comes to the
need to take into account the vulnerability of a client’s family member,50 say, or consider-
ing the impact of a company’s merger upon the environment and members of the local
community, an ability to see beyond one’s immediate query does condition the ethical
awareness which a professional needs if she is to live up to her particular responsibility.
Professions-speciﬁc automated systems can and should be designed with a view to fos-
tering such perspective widening. To that end, they may usefully leverage recent research
on the factors that impact upon individuals’ diﬀerential creativity.51 Among the character-
istics used to assess such creativity,52 ﬂuency and ﬂexibility are of particular relevance
48In the ﬁeld of consumer protection, apps that allow for the automatic detection of ‘unfair clauses [that] are currently
hidden within long and hardly readable ToS’; M Lippi and others, ‘Automated Detection of Unfair Clauses in Online Con-
sumer Contracts’ (2017) 302 Legal Knowledge and Information Systems Frontierst in Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Applications
145 may be valuable as a stop-gap measure, but in the longer term those apps may end up standing in the way of a
much-needed, fundamental reform in the way informed consent is obtained.
49
[T]he horrible thing about all legal oﬃcials, even the best, about all judges, magistrates, barristers, detectives, and
policemen, is not that they are wicked (some of them are good), not that they are stupid (several of them are
quite intelligent). It is simply that they have got used to it. Strictly they do not see the prisoner in the dock;
all they see is the usual man in the usual place. They do not see the awful court of judgment; they only see
their own workshop. (GK Chesterton, ‘The Twelve Men’ in GK Chesteron (ed), Tremendous Triﬂes (Sheed &
Ward 1955))
50For a study examining the impact of expertise and cognitive load upon a GP’s ability to pick up signs of child-safeguard-
ing concerns, see X Pan and others, ‘A Study of Professional Awareness Using Immersive Virtual Reality: The Responses of
General Practitioners to Child Safeguarding Concerns’ (2018) Frontiers in Robotics and AI <https://doi.org/10.3389/
frobt.2018.00080>.
51DL Zabelina and others, ‘Patterning and Nonpatterning in Creative Cognition: Insights from Performance in a Random
Number Generation Task’ (2012) 6(2) Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts 137.
52The recently published report sponsored by the French Parliament ‘For a meaningful artiﬁcial intelligence’; C Villani, For a
Meaningful Artiﬁcial Intelligence: Towards a French and European Strategy (Villani Mission on Artiﬁcial Intelligence 2018)
highlights at several points the need to look ‘ into the complementarity between humans and artiﬁcial intelligence: if we
are to assume that, for most jobs, individuals will have to work with a machine, then it is vital to ﬁnd a complementarity
set-up that does not alienate staﬀ but instead allows for the development of truly human capabilities, such as creativity,
manual dexterity, problem- solving abilities, etc.’
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when it comes to countering the eﬀects of professional routine. Yet so far the fast-devel-
oping research on artiﬁcial creativity has not ventured as much as it could into potential
professions-speciﬁc, ethics-oriented applications.53 If we can have systems that foster the
creativity of mathematicians54 and musicians, why not lawyers? Some would retort that
lawyers are not supposed to think too creatively: their professional practice is meant to
be structured around well-deﬁned procedures, rules and principles, and decision-
support systems are there, if anything, to help them abide by those procedures while redu-
cing cognitive load. The latter understanding of professional responsibility is, sadly, as
common as it is ﬂawed. Far from a ‘moral sums game’ at which one may excel, pro-
fessional ethics can only be practiced: the dynamic and fallible nature of the values at
stake requires constant, renewed engagement. Since the latter can all too easily get com-
promised under the combined weight of time pressure and management constraints, pro-
fessions-speciﬁc decision-support systems ought to draw upon the growing number of
‘creativity focused’ applications in domains ranging from art to business.55 They also
need to take into account our weaknesses and biases. While the impact of so-called ‘auto-
mation bias’ is considered in (i), our normative laziness and the ‘loaﬁng eﬀect’ is addressed
in (ii).
2.2.1. Instrumental rationality and automation bias
When discussing what they call the ‘Trust Objection’ (in relation to the deployment of
automated systems within the professions), the Susskinds argue:
Our primary need is only for a reliable outcome. Of course, we do not want the people and
systems that meet this need to be dishonest or criminal. But neither do we necessarily need
them to be motivated by an altruistic regard for others. That would be too onerous a require-
ment. Our primary concern need not be with altruism or the achievement of the highest
ethical ideals but to make sure that our problems are resolved reliably, eﬃciently, and
eﬀectively.56
The above quote has the merit of being candid. The instrumental rationality57 that is
openly at work here often underlies the uncritical endorsement of various forms of
eﬃciency maximising technologies. Of course, there is nothing wrong with an endeavour
to maximise eﬃciency per se. What needs to be considered, rather, is the extent to which
53For a notable study in that direction, see J Inthorn, ME Tabacchi and R Seising, ‘Having the Final Say: Machine Support of
Ethical Decisions of Doctors’ in Simon Peter van Rysewyk and Matthijs Pontier (eds), Machine Medical Ethics (Springer
2015):
The DSS can ask the right questions, can suggest diﬀerent ethical perspectives […] and it can certainly inspire
creativity. Creativity can be simulated in the system by stretching the given parameter ranges, using the perspec-
tives of other actors, or even putting the problem description in another context. This can help the user to ﬁnd
solutions that are not limited by a restricted frame of mind that focuses on the situation at hand but frequently
misses ideas on how to extend or modify decision spaces by integrating multiple perspectives and normative
questions into decision making processes.
54‘Heuristics for transforming conceptual spaces, including the space of heuristics, have been applied in a number of pro-
grams (leant 1983). One of these, whose task is to generate new mathematical concepts [is called ‘the automatic math-
ematician’]. [It] might be developed for other domains, in which the knowledge and judgment of human users could aid,
and be aided by, the application of the transformational and evaluative heuristics’. M Boden, Creativity and Art: Three
Roads to Surprise (OUP 2010).
55F Adam and others, Creativity and Innovation in Decision Making and Decision Support (Ludic Publishing LTD 2006).
56Susskind and Susskind (n 5).
57When it informs the assessment of actions, ‘instrumental rationality’ assesses actions solely by reference to how eﬀective
they are in achieving their speciﬁed end (hence without the need to judge the legitimacy of that end).
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the rapid growth in the deployment of professions-speciﬁc systems is at all likely to
amplify the dangers inherent in a technology-enabled ‘cloak of instrumental rationality’:58
The enabling technology can mesmerise the actors, shielding or displacing the moral issues
present. It appears that technology is the updraft that allows and facilitates a dramatic spread
of an ideology legitimised by the unquestioned reign of instrumental rationality.59
This unquestioning attitude towards technology has notably been associated with what
social psychology studies call ‘automation bias’. These studies suggest that ‘automated
devices can fundamentally change how people approach their work, which in turn can
lead to new and diﬀerent kinds of error’.60 Because errors that stem from having
allowed incorrect automated input to override a correct, ‘human’ – i.e. non-automated
– judgment (those errors are classiﬁed as ‘automation bias’) are both diﬃcult to track
down and only anecdotally reported, studies of automation bias have so far mostly61 pro-
ceeded on the basis of randomised controlled trials,62 such as Skitka et al.’s study.63 The
latter compared error rates in a simulated ﬂight task with and without a computer that
monitored system states and made decision recommendations. When the automated
aid was inaccurate (missing a key event for instance), participants in the non-automated
condition outperformed those in the automated condition.
Of particular interest are the causal factors that Skitka et al. hypothesised might con-
tribute to the commission and omission errors associated with the presence of automated
decision aids. Among these, Skitka et al. identify cognitive miserliness64 – ‘most people will
take the road of least cognitive eﬀort, and rather than systematically analyse each decision,
will use decision rules of thumb or heuristics’ (automated systems will act as the latter).65
They also refer to what they call ‘social loaﬁng, diﬀusion of responsibility66 and possible
belief in the relative authority of computers and automated decision aids’:
Finally, people may respond to computers and automated decision aids as decision- making
authorities. Obedience can be deﬁned as people’s willingness to conform to the demands of
58‘Morrow’s assessment of the potential for disconnect between technology and morality, that ‘[t]he story of evil in the
world is so often a matter of hardware outperforming conscience: Can outruns Should. Or rather, Can outruns Should
Not’: L Morrow, Evil: An Investigation (Basic Books 2003) 56, corroborates this concern’ GS Reed and N Jones, ‘Toward
Modeling and Automating Ethical Decision Making: Design, Implementation, Limitations, and Responsibilities’ (2013)
32 Topoi 237.
59JF Dillard, ‘Professional Services, IBM, and the Holocaust’ (2003) 17 Journal of Information Systems 14.
60LJ Skitka, K Mosier and MD Burdick, ‘Accountability and Automation Bias’ (2000) 52 International Journal of Human-Com-
puter Studies 701.
61With a few exceptions, see notably EM Campbell and others, ‘Overdependence on Technology: An Unintended Adverse
Consequence of Computerized Provider Order Entry’ (AMIA Annual Symposium Proceedings, Vol. 2007, 94, American
Medical Informatics Association 2007) for a study based on ﬁeldwork.
62These randomized controlled trials may not be ideally suited to understanding the impact of automated decision aids in
real-life circumstances.
63LJ Skitka, KL Mosier and M Burdick, ‘Does Automation Bias Decision-Making?’ (1999) 51 International Journal of Human-
Computer Studies 991.
64The term ‘cognitive miser’ comes from J Crocker, ST Fiske and SE Taylor, ‘Schematic Bases of Belief Change’ in J Richard
Eiser (eds), Attitudinal Judgment (Springer 1984).
65Skitka, Mosier and Burdick (n 63) 992.
66
Given that people treat computers who share task responsibilities as a ‘team member’, and show many of the
same in-group favoritism eﬀects for computers that they show with people (Nass, Fogg and Moon 1996), it
may not be surprising to ﬁnd that diﬀusion of responsibility and social loaﬁng eﬀects also emerge in human-com-
puter interaction. To the extent that some tasks are shared with computerized or automated decision aids people
may well diﬀuse responsibility for those tasks to those aids, and feel less compelled to put forth a strong indi-
vidual eﬀort. (ibid 992)
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an authority, even if those demands violate people’s sense of what is right […] Given that
computers and automated decision aids are introduced into many work environments
with the articulated goal of reducing human error, they may well be interpreted to be
smarter and more authoritative than their users. To the extent that people view compu-
ters and automated decision aids as authorities, they may be more likely to blindly follow
their recommendations, even in the face of information that indicates they would be
wiser not to.67
The latter two factors (diﬀusion of responsibility and deference to authority) are of par-
ticular importance for our present concerns. For the decision aid systems that may plau-
sibly be used in the legal profession diﬀer in some important ways from those used for
plane navigation. When a decision needs to be made based on the latter, both the par-
ameters that ought to inform the decision and the options underlying it are well
deﬁned. For a wide range of legal matters, by contrast, the parameters that contribute
to both the framing and the solution of a problem are the product of a value-laden
interpretation. The responsibility (and apparent precariousness) entailed by this inevitable
axiological component can be hard to bear. In that context, any opportunity to ‘pass the
moral buck’ is particularly attractive, especially when the ‘buck’ is passed to a system that
does not deal in ambiguities and raw intuitions, thus conveniently ironing out dimly per-
ceived inconsistencies or unarticulated ethical concerns.
2.2.2. A special kind of moral philosopher? Beware what you wish for.
According to the Susskinds, it is possible that:
future systems (modelled, for example, on traditional, rule-based expert systems) could
articulate and balance moral arguments, identify consistencies and illogicalities, point out
assumptions and presuppositions of given lines of debate, and identify conclusions that
can validly be drawn from some set of premises. Such systems would be a special kind of
moral philosopher, capable of clear and structured reasoning about ethical issues.68
The emphasis on ‘clear and structured reasoning’, pointing at a procedural rather
than substantive understanding of ethical expertise has the advantage of avoiding the
naïve (and all too common) assumption that currently dominates discussions of what
computer scientists call ‘the value-alignment problem’. Its discussion indeed often pro-
ceeds from the assumption that moral values are essentially static: once the values that
are relevant to a particular application have been identiﬁed (a challenge in itself), one
may proceed with their neat incorporation into a system that is designed to simplify
our practical reasoning.
Aside from its naivety (given ongoing, constantly evolving ethical disagreements), I
have highlighted elsewhere69 the danger inherent in such an assumption, which may
well turn into a self-fulﬁlling prophecy: what if we do indeed end up with a set of static
moral values? Rather than reﬂecting some fanciful state of collective ‘ideological and
ethical contentment’, such a standstill would be brought about because of a novel type
of collective disability, triggered by lack of normative exercise.
67ibid.
68Susskind and Susskind (n 5).
69S Delacroix, Taking Turing by Surprise? Designing Autonomous Systems for Morally-Loaded Contexts (2019) <https://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3025626>.
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Whenever decision-support systems succeed in enabling us to step back and relax –
somehow trusting machines to have gotten our ‘moral sums’ right –, they cannot but com-
promise the critical engagement necessary to live up to one’s ethical responsibility. Now,
the answer is not to ditch any form decision-support, but rather to design the latter diﬀer-
ently. Of particular interest, in terms of method, are systems that keep end-users within
the learning loop. Sometimes referred to as ‘interactive machine learning’ or ‘IML’,70
this method demands regular input on the part of end-users (as well as their monitoring
the result of the learning process), in turn requiring the designers of such systems to pay a
lot more attention to the extent to which particular design choices are likely to foster
(rather than diminish) the extent to which end-users retain a critical, reﬂective stance
during their interaction with computer systems.71 Aside from potentially improving the
system’s learning performance, this interactive method also has the potential to keep
moral torpor at bay by encouraging an ‘ethical feedback loop’ that carves a continuous,
active role on the part of the professional community whom the system is designed for.
3. Conclusion
Tomorrow’s ‘professional workshop’ is more likely than not to rely heavily on automated
systems. There may come a time when these automated systems’ superior reliability see-
mingly extends tomost of the work associated with a particular profession. Given the likely
aﬀordability gains concomitant with widespread automation, it will be tempting to con-
sider the latter’s desirability (and legitimacy) as self-evident. This essay hopes to have con-
tributed robust grounds to question this consequentialist logic, whose inﬂuence is felt well
beyond the Susskinds’ book (and academia).
Section 1 challenges the minimalist understanding of the professions that conditions
much of the Susskinds’ normative conclusions. If the speciﬁc responsibility of legal pro-
fessionals stems from more than ‘ideological rhetoric’, and is concomitant with the fact
that it is our commitment to moral equality that is at stake every time lawyers (fail to)
hail the speciﬁc vulnerability inherent in their professional relationship, the case for
wholesale automation is turned on its head. One can no longer assume that, as a
rule, wholesale automation is both legitimate and desirable, provided it improves the
quality and accessibility of legal services.72 The assumption, instead, is ﬁrmly in
70
Although humans are an integral part of the learning process (the provide labels, rankings etc.), traditional
machine learning systems used in these applications are agnostic to the fact that inputs/outputs are from/for
humans. In contrast, interactive machine learning places end-users in the learning loop (end users is an integral
part of the learning process), observing the result of learning and providing input meant to improve the learning
outcome. Canonical applications of IML include scenarios involving humans interacting with robots to teach them
to perform certain tasks, humans helping virtual agents play computer games by giving them feedback on their
performance. (Wendell Wallach and C Allen, Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong (OUP 2008))
71A number of human-computer interaction studies have recently started to focus on the value inherent in fostering a
reﬂective attitude on the part of technology users. Along this line, see ED Mekler and K Hornbaek, ‘Momentary Pleasure
or Lasting Meaning?: Distinguishing Eudaimonic and Hedonic User Experiences’ (Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference
on Human Factors in Computing Systems (2016)) as well as P Slovák, C Frauenberger and G Fitzpatrick, ‘Reﬂective Prac-
ticum: A Framework of Sensitising Concepts to Design for Transformative Reﬂection’ (Proceedings of the 2017 CHI Con-
ference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (2017)).
72And preserves a minimum degree of transparency, accountability and privacy – the fast-growing research concerning the
feasibility – and desirability- of the latter constraints in the context of various kinds of automation is beyond the scope of
this review (see note 47).
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favour of designing systems that better enable legal professionals to live up to their
speciﬁc responsibility.
The second section outlines key challenges in the design of such profession-speciﬁc,
‘ethics aware’ decision-support systems. Aside from reducing professionals’ cognitive
load, decision-support systems can and should be designed to counter the eﬀects of rou-
tinisation, raise awareness of seemingly peripheral considerations and, most importantly,
better listen to and engage with the person seeking professional expertise. Our growing
understanding of the non-cognitive underpinnings of professional judgment (in part
thanks to virtual reality simulations73) – combined with novel, creativity-focussed AI
research – has the potential to radically alter the way we design decision-support
systems meant for the morally-loaded contexts that pervade most of the legal profession.
This potential will only be realised, however, if the legal profession as a whole proactively
engages in a long overdue debate about the values it stands for (as a profession) and the
extent to which current system design choices may hamper or foster those values.
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